I. INTRODUCTION
As the stock markets of the developing countries grow and assume a more prominent role in the economy, the regulatory framework continues to evolve alongside. Functions of a market regulator include enhancing disclosure of information and preventing the misuse of asymmetric or insider information, thereby increasing efficiency of intermediation by financial markets with respect to savings, price discovery, allocation of investment, and the pricing and hedging of risk. Regulatory agencies can add value by reducing problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard by enhancing transparency and disclosure and by mitigating conflicts of interest. Moreover, regulators in the emerging markets are particularly concerned over excessive market volatility since it is considered, among other factors, reflecting possible market manipulation and speculative trading. In the presence of network effects, where value to any one individual increases with the increase in the number of participants, a herding behaviour can ensue and lead to excessive volatility and sharp swings in the stock prices.
A lack of trust in the fairness of markets due to potential for manipulation, highlighted by recurring scandals, scams, and irrational exuberance of the investors, manifesting itself in speculative bubbles, exacerbate the market volatility. Such manipulative and speculative behaviour imposes implicit costs on the market participants and increases the cost of intermediation. The inefficiencies in market intermediation increase the cost of capital and can be a drag on the economic development. Kanes (1988) sees financial instability as a cost of inefficient financial regulation. Khwaja and Mian (2005) document the direct cost of poor governance of market intermediaries.
In this study we examine the regulatory effectiveness in two emerging markets in South Asia, India and Pakistan, in dealing with allegations of market manipulation and volatility. We study two episodes in India and one in Pakistan during which allegations of massive speculation, manipulation and scandals led to political pressures on the regulators to phase out a traditional institution common to the two countries, that is, of "badla" or Carry-Over-Trade (COT) financing. The next section provides institutional background of the two markets. In Section III we describe speculative episodes and the regulatory response in both countries. Section IV explains the empirical methodology used to examine the change in the market behaviour following regulatory intervention. Section V presents results of our empirical research. We note that while Indian regulatory response seems to have achieved its objectives in curtailing manipulative and speculative behaviour, there seems to be no impact on such behaviour in the case of Karachi Sock Exchange (KSE). The final section presents summary and conclusions.
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE, now known as The Stock Exchange, Mumbai) is the oldest stock exchange in Asia having been established in 1875. Over 4,700 stocks with a total market capitalisation of about US $553 billion are traded on the exchange. The BSE is among the 5 biggest stock exchanges in the world in terms of transactions volume. The BSE was organised as an Association of Persons (AOP) until 2005 when the Exchange was de-mutualised and incorporated as an corporate entity. With the conversion from a mutual form to the corporate form, the trading rights and ownership rights have been de-linked to address concerns regarding perceived and real conflicts of interest.
A major institutional development in India has been the setting up of the National Stock Exchange (NSE). The Bombay stock exchange was perceived to be stuck in the traditional ways, and as an obstacle in the modernisation of the capital markets. The National Stock Exchange of India was promoted by leading financial institutions at the behest of the Government of India, and was incorporated in November 1992. Within one year of the onset of equity trading at NSE, it became India's most liquid stock market. The launch of derivatives in 2000 by NSE further choked the Bombay Stock Exchange, which has lost market share to the NSE every year since then. In equity trading volume the BSE share slipped from 45 percent in 2000 to under 32 percent at present. The two exchanges represent more than 90 percent share in aggregate turnover of the 23 stock exchanges in the country.
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), established in 1947, is the oldest and the most active of the three stock exchanges in Pakistan, and currently lists 662 companies with a total market capitalisation of about $52 billion. The KSE100 represents major blue chips companies and is fairly good representative of the market. Besides the KSE there are two regional stock exchanges in Lahore and Islamabad. The other two exchanges are, however, relatively inactive. For example, during July 2005-March 2006 period the average daily turnover at the KSE was 462.4 million share, while at LSE and ISE it was 65.4 and 1.7 million shares, representing 12 percent and 3 percent of the total market activity respectively. Despite the small size of the market, KSE experiences a high turnover and high price volatility. Exhibit A provides salient features of BSE and KSE for comparison. The KSE is relatively a much smaller market compared to the BSE, both in terms of the listed companies as well as market capitalisation. Reflecting its smaller size the KSE represents only 0.7 percent of the total capitalisation of the emerging markets, compared to BSE's 7.9 percent share. It is interesting to note the sharp contrast between Pakistan's capitalisation ratio (which is low) and relatively high turnover ratio. This characteristic probably reflects noise trading and speculative element in the market. The spectacular rise in the KSE (S&P/IFC Index) of 410 percent over the 2001-05 period is remarkable, though 260 percent appreciation of the BSE also stands in sharp contrast with the performance elsewhere in the world. The appreciation in the KSE100 index and BSE30 index was 534 percent and 137 percent respectively for the same period. The Pakistani stock market appreciation was four times higher than the Indian market despite a higher rate of growth in the Indian GDP for the same period. Exhibit A also shows that the PE ratio and Price to Book value of Pakistani companies included in the S&P/IFC Global Index is nearly 2/3, and the dividend yield nearly half of that of the Indian companies. Another important difference is the higher degree of correlation of the BSE (0.69) with the S&P Composite Index, compared with correlation coefficient of 0.32 in case of KSE, which reflects a higher degree of integration of the BSE with the international capital markets.
Besides, the differences between the two markets in size, activity and other characteristics noted above, there are two aspects of these markets which may have a direct bearing on the regulatory response and its effectiveness in dealing with market manipulation and volatility. First, there is difference in the industry structure and competition among the stock exchanges. As already noted above, in case of India, NSE has emerged as the leading stock exchange in the country, with 45 percent market share, thus eliminating BSE's monopolistic position that it had enjoyed ever since its inception.
NSE along with 22 other active regional exchanges creates a more competitive environment. In Pakistan, KSE is the dominant player with 85 percent share of the trading activity.
Second, there seems to be a significant difference between the regulatory enforcement and effectiveness of public policy. Nageswaran and Krithivasan (2006) , for example, claim that only Singapore, Hong Kong and India are effective in enforcement among Asian countries. According to data compiled by Goyal (2004) , SEBI had taken up 657 cases for investigation in the period 1992-2003, and had completed 424 cases. 250 prosecutions were launched against collective investment schemes over 2001-03. During the same year there were 257 actions taken against brokers and others out of which there were 42 suspensions. SEBI's record in redressing grievances also appears to be effective; the redress rate is about 95 percent. In contrast, according to a survey conducted by La Porta, et al. (2006) Pakistan scores rather low on the indices of (i) orders to issuers, distributors and accountants (ii) criminal sanctions and (iii) public enforcement which capture the extent to which a public regulator exercises investigative power and its ability to impose penalties. Pakistan's score on these three indices is 0.17, 0.08 and 0.58, compared to India's 0.67, 0.83 and 0.67 respectively. Khwaja and Mian (2005) remark with respect to Pakistan that, "Thus, it is not surprising that to date there has hardly been any case in which a broker was prosecuted for improper activity."
The Badla or Traditional Carry Forward System
An old and traditional informal institution common to both India and Pakistan is that of Badla, meaning something in return. It is a local term for a forward trading facility, and essentially is a repo transaction carried out in a separate after-hours market where the borrower who takes the badla from a badla broker, carries forward his security exposure from the current settlement period to the next one, by sale of his position in the present period and its repurchase in the subsequent settlement period at a predetermined price differential. In the event of a purchase, the investor may want to carry forward the transaction to the next settlement cycle and for doing so, he has to compensate the seller who sold it with an intention of receiving cash.
III. MARKET CRISIS AND REGULATORY RESPONSE The Indian Experience
In June 1991, the new Indian government accelerated the process of economic liberalisation, privatisation and opening up of the economy, setting off expectations of an unprecedented growth and prosperity for the economy. The stock market started booming-the BSE30 rose from around 1000 in February 1991 to a peak of 4500 in March 1992. There was an enormous increase in the demand for margin finance by the investors, while, there were heavy margins imposed by the BSE. It led the market participants to find innovative solutions, sometimes not legal, to meet their financing requirements.
The new free market environment put immense pressure on the public sector, in particular on the nationalised banks, to improve financial performance and capital adequacy. Banks, holding large cash balances not subject to reserve requirements under the Portfolio Management Scheme and cash raised by the public sector units through foreign exchange borrowing, became eager to explore new venues of higher returns. The market did not take long to innovative ways of avoiding regulation and diverting funds from the banking system (from the inter-bank market for government securities) to the stock market. It was done mainly through the ready forward deal mechanism, a variant of repo or repurchase agreement, and the badla system often using fraudulent and nonexisting securities. The resulting "securities scam," personified by Hashad Metha, led to a diversion of funds to the tune of over $ 1.2 billion from the banking system to the stock market during the period April 1991 to May 1992. For a detailed reconstruction of the scam and regulatory response see Barua and Varma (1993) .
With the discovery of the scam, the stock prices dropped by over 40 percent in less than two months, wiping out market value by about $35 billion. The government responded by promulgating an ordinance with several harsh provisions, including attachment of the properties of the accused in the scam. It set up a special court to try those accused in the scam. It also voided all transactions in "tainted shares" that had been routed through involved brokers and their firms, which also caused market disruption. Another unintended consequence was to slow down the reform process which busted the speculative boom of early 1990s.
The badla system was blamed for causing "excessive speculations" in the market and for the irregularities in the stock exchanges in the form of non-enforcement of margins, non-reporting of transactions and illegal trading outside the stock exchange. Consequently, in March 1994 the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) effectively banned the facility, but, yielding to the demands from the brokerage community, introduced a modified badla system subject to certain safeguards effective January 1996. In 1997 further safeguards were put in place, such as segregation of carry forward transactions at the time of execution of trade, daily margin of 10 percent, onehalf of which would be collected upfront, and overall carry forward limits per broker.
In the late 1990s the dotcom boom in information, communications, and entertainment stocks all over the world contributed to the bull run on the BSE, which almost doubled in a short period from January 1999 to February 2000. The speculative spell led to overextended positions, and afforded many opportunities for fraud and manipulation, personified by the Bombay Bull, Ketan Parekh, considered to be the main villain. He had managed to manipulate ill-liquid stocks, known as the 'K-10' stocks, by borrowing from various companies and banks using the shares as collateral. It worked well in the bull market, but busted when the markets started crashing in March 2000, led by a fall in the NASDAQ. In the next two months, while the NASDAQ declined by 35.9 percent, Sensex lost 23 percent and the K-10 stocks crashed by 67 percent [see ICFAI (2002) ].
Following the crash in the stock markets SEBI launched immediate investigations into the volatility of stock markets. SEBI also decided to inspect the books of several brokers who were suspected of triggering the crash. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) ordered investigation into the capital market exposure of some banks, following media reports that some banks may have exceeded prudential norms of capital exposure, thereby contributing to the stock market volatility. The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) President was forced to resign following allegations that he had used some privileged information, which contributed to the crash. In the aftermath, at least eight people were reported to have committed suicide while hundreds of investors were driven to the brink of bankruptcy. The scam brought into question banks' funding of capital market operations and lending funds against security collateral. It also shattered investors' confidence in the functioning of the stock markets. SEBI launched a cycle of regulation to control the damage including increasing margin requirements, imposing restriction on short sales, and requiring stock deliveries following sale. It suspended all of the broker member directors of BSE's board and banned trading by exchange officers. The badla system was banned, effective from July 2001, and a rolling settlement system was introduced.
The Pakistan Experience
The KSE experienced a steady bull run as reflected in both the KSE 100 index and trading volumes, starting just after the last stock market crisis in After the March 2005 crisis, a task force was set up by the Chairman of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) to identify the causes for the situation arising at the country's three stock exchanges in March 2005 and to propose measures for strengthening and consolidating the regulatory regime, particularly with a view to enabling emergency intervention, preventing systematic risk and promoting market stability. The task force completed its report in July 2005 identifying a few areas that contributed to the instability in the stock prices. The Task Force recommended that there was a need for structural reforms and steps were needed to protect public interest by ensuring that the financial might that has been accumulated by the stock brokerage and badla financing institutions should be effectively checked and brought to a reasonable size to ensure that they are unable to manipulate the market.
Besides badla financing, other factors which contributed to this bull-run included, increased liquidity due to higher foreign remittances, a regime of low interest rates, IPO's of public sector enterprises marked for divestment and floatation of more mutual funds. During this period, especially since mid October, 2004, there was an unusual build-up in the media about the prospects of a rise in the KSE index. Statements from government officials linked the rise in the KSE index to good economic management, indicated that the market was destined to rise further, and announcement of the impending accelerated program for the privatisation of prominent and profitable public sector corporations fuelled the bullish sentiment. Conduct of corporate officials contributed to the market speculation; for example, rumors of new oil and gas discoveries which would raise stock value manifold went un-refuted or clarified by the management. There were also allegations of "wash trades" and "pump and dump" plays by brokers.
The main thrust of the Pakistani regulators was to replace badla with formal financing arrangements. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) in collaboration with SECP came out with rules governing margin financing issued to stock brokers by banks. The SBP rules specified the conditions of extending such loans to stock market brokers with proper risk management and internal controls. It also specified the minimum margin requirement of 30 percent and reminded banks of the per party limit, in case of such lending to brokers. The SECP had intended to completely eliminate the carryover market (the badla market) by the end of December 2004, but slow progress by the regulators delayed implementation.
Regarding the replacement of badla financing the regulatory body was seen as vacillating. For example, we quote a newspaper op-ed, Badla is back. "But firmness doesn't appear to be the strong point of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. … What went wrong? Or, rather, how heavy was the pressure from vested interests? Were the members of the Karachi Stock Exchange so powerful that they managed to force the regulator to work in their interest? The SECP has not only proved to be a weak regulator but also exposed itself to the criticism that it acts first and thinks later" [The News (2005) ].
There were other factors which lessened the effectiveness of the regulators' actions. First, the composition of the Task Force was not without conflicts of interest as its members also were on the Policy Board investigating matters which should have been the subject matter of the Board itself when formulating capital markets policies. Second, the mostly held view is that the March debacle was due to excessive institutional selling and the withdrawal of badla financing simultaneously from the market. In the past, SECP had been criticised for allowing the brokerage houses to own commercial and investment banks which provided them additional resources to enter into badla financing and use it to manipulate market. Third, the Task Force, a creation of SECP itself, could not look into the question of inadequate surveillance and weak implementation by SECP.
The Task Force also did not look into the role of KSE management, in possibly precipitating the withdrawal of the badla facility by calling upon the various brokers and institutions to reconfirm that they would be able to honor their obligations in the future contracts, and sending alarming signals to market players. As there were four SECP nominated directors on the KSE board, there is a possibility of conflict of interest. However, while the KSE does receive some oversight from the SECP, it is predominantly broker-managed, i.e., majority of the exchange's board of directors including the chairman are brokers. The Task force also did not investigate the allegation of market manipulation by certain mutual funds through withdrawing the badla financing and to take advantage of the pursuing crash.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY
In order to empirically analyse the impact of the regulatory intervention, primarily abolishing of badla system, following market scams and episodes of speculative behaviour, we study the return volatility in the two stock exchanges before and after the events. It is strongly argued in the finance literature [e.g., De Long, Shleifer, et al. (1990) ] that noise traders cause excessive trading and volatility. Speculative trading in derivative securities has also been blamed for causing excessive volatility (Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam, 1993) . Some economists have even argued for imposing tax on shortterm trades to contain volatility [e.g., Stiglitz (1989) ].
Among the related research, in the context of India, Bhattacharya, et al. (2003) examine the stability of the day-of-the-week effect in returns and volatility during 1991-2000 and do not find the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable for badla financing to be significant. Goswami and Angshuman (2000) also report that badla trading had no impact on the day-of the-week pattern of returns. Eleswarapu and Krishnamurti (1995) study whether badla financing facility had led to speculative volatility on the Bombay Stock Exchange prior to March 1994. They do not "find any evidence that supports the allegations made by regulators that badla trading destabilises the stock prices and causes excessive volatility." The impact of abolishing of badla system in Pakistan has not been studied so far to our knowledge. However, Ahmed, Rosser and Uppal (1996) document the existence of bubbles over the period 1987 -1994 . Mangla and Uppal (1996 report market inefficiencies. The existence of price manipulative behaviour on the KSE is rigorously documented by Khawja and Mian (2005) .
We conduct empirical analysis of the impact of regulatory intervention in the two markets in order to subdue speculative behaviour with reference to stock price volatility. First, we examine the variance of the stock returns and conduct F-test for variance equality. Second, we modify the variance tests to exclude possible influence of the international stock markets and conditional auto-regressive heteroskedasticity on the variance process. Variance of the residuals from the GARCH-M model in the before-and after-sub-periods are tested for equality by employing the usual F-test. Third, we include a dummy variable in the GARCH variance equation to capture the impact of the regulatory response on the market volatility. The GARCH methodology is further explain below.
Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity was proposed by Engle (1982) to explain the tendency of large residuals to cluster together. A general form of an ARCH/GARCH model is: y t = X t β + u t , and the variance of u t , h t follows the process:
Where α is a set of unknown parameter. In the Bollerslav (1986) model, the variance term depends upon the lagged variances, as well as the lagged squared residuals, to model persistence in volatility. The variance model for the standard GARCH (p, q) model is:
. + b p h t-p
We employ GARCH(1,1) to account for the persistence in volatility in the returns series. The GARCH-M model employed here is as follows:
In our model X t consists of, besides the constant term, a vector of 'returns' on the MSCI World Index measured as RI t = ln(I t ) -ln(I t-1 ), and the conditional variance (h t ) as explanatory variables. Variance of the residuals from the GARCH-M model in the before-and after-regulatory change are then tested for equality employing the usual F-test.
The impact on return volatility following regulatory response is also examined by including a dummy variable D t in the variance Equations (2) which takes a value of one for period after the change in the regulations and zero otherwise. The variance equation with the regulatory dummy is now as follows:
The coefficient on the dummy variable should capture the impact of regulatory intervention on the volatility of the market returns.
Data and Sample Period
Data for this study was taken from the Datastream International, Ltd. Database for the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 Index (KSE100) and for Bombay Stock Exchange index of 30 major companies (BSE30 SENSITIVE). Daily closing values of the indices were used for the period from 1/1/1993 to 12/29/1995, and from 1/1/2000 to 3/31/2003 for the BSE to cover the two periods during the period of change. The corresponding event window is form 1/1/2004 to 8/30/2006 for the KSE. We study the market behaviour by dividing each event window into, before and after sub-periods. For the BSE, we leave out a three month intervals between the sub-periods to allow the market to adjust to the new regulatory environment. For the KSE, we exclude five months since the issue remained under consideration for longer period and the change was not implemented immediately. All price data was converted to "returns" by taking the natural log differences of the index level P t thus: R t = ln(P t ) -ln(P t-1 ).
V. RESULTS
Summary statistical results for the first four moments for the return series are shown in Table 1 . We note that the return distributions in both countries exhibit significant departure from the normal distribution, Skewness and Kurtosis are very significant, and the Jarque-Bera statistic for both markets and for all periods strongly rejects normality hypothesis. Results for tests for difference in the mean for the two subperiod samples are presented in Table 2 . For the 1994 instance of abolishing badla in India, the mean daily return for the BSE in the first sub-period is 0.1636 percent, while it is -0.0503 percent in the second sub-period. The t-test for mean difference is significant at 5 percent level; one-tail probability (T ≤ t) is 3.5 percent. On the other hand, for the second event of banning badla system in 2001, the mean difference is not significant at conventional levels; the achieved significance level is 16.2 percent. In Table 2 , the t-test for mean difference in the daily return on the KSE in the two sub-periods is not significant; one-tail probability (T ≤ t) is 23.6 percent. Though the mean difference is not significant, it is interesting to note that the sample mean daily returns in second subperiod, though lower than in the first sub-period, remains high relative to historic experience and to the other emerging markets. It seems that the KSE bullish sentiment continued to rule, contrary to the intentions of the regulators. Table 3 (panel A) presents the test results for difference in the variance over the studied events in the two markets. For the BSE, the F-test for unequal variance strongly rejects the null hypothesis both for the 1994 and 2001 episodes. For the 1994-95 study period the variance of daily returns in the second sub-period was significantly lower than in the first; 0.0126 percent compared with 0.0327 percent. Similarly, for the 2000-03 study period, the variance in the later sub-period (0.0128 percent) is significantly lower than in the first sub-period (0.0420 percent). The behaviour of the KSE, however, appears to be quite the opposite. The sample variance is actually higher in the second period than in the first, 0.0280 percent vs. 0.0098 percent, or approximately 2.8 times the first subperiod variance. The F-test for unequal variance strongly rejects the null. In order to study the response of the two markets with respect to the regulatory changes with more robust controls, we account for the possibility of international stock markets and conditional auto-regressive heteroskedasticity influencing the variance process. It was accomplished by including the MSCI World index in a GARCH-M model and then conducting an equality of variance F-test on the residuals. The results of the test of variance equality are presented in panel B of Table 3 . The results confirm the conclusion from the test on unadjusted variances reported in panel A, i.e., for the Indian experience the volatility subsided following regulatory measures, while it was exacerbated in the case of KSE. The shift in the variance is in the opposite direction for the two markets and is statistically significant in all cases. Table 4 reports results from estimation of the GARCH-M model with dummy variable representing the regulatory change. The dummy variable for the Indian market has a negative coefficient which is statistically significant at 5 percent significance level. It indicates that the variance of the return process dropped significantly after the regulatory intervention. On the other hand in the case of the Karachi Stock Exchange the dummy variable is not statistically significant, although it is of positive sign. Thus the robust tests for the shift in volatility tend to support the conclusions of the simple test of variance equality. In addition, all GARCH variables C, A and B, corresponding to the GARCH Equation (2) are statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient for MSCI World Index is statistically significant for the Indian market, while not significant for the Pakistani market. It seems to point out to the greater integration of the Indian stock market with the financial markets of the rest of the world. Note: * and ** indicate statistical significance level of 10 percent and 5 percent respectively.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analysed episodes of market manipulation and volatility and the ensuing regulatory intervention in two emerging South Asian markets, India and Pakistan. Our empirical analysis indicates that while the Indian regulatory agencies seem to have achieved their objectives in curtailing manipulative and speculative behaviour, there seems to be little impact on such behaviour in the case of KSE. The bullish sentiment and volatility on the KSE continued unabated despite the measures taken by the SECP apparently to curtail speculative trading allegedly fanned by the badla system. On the other hand the regulator of the BSE appears to have succeeded in their goals of cooling off the market in both 1994-95 and 2000-03 periods.
Though there are commonalities in terms of civil code, and cultural and business environments in the two countries, we note significant differences in the regulatory effectiveness and industry structure that may explain the difference in the market behaviour outcomes following regulatory interventions. It is important to note that the response of the Indian regulators in dealing with the market manipulations and speculative behaviour appears to be much stronger and effective than was the case in Pakistan. The Indians regulatory response was three pronged: (1) discovering and punishing the guilty, (2) recovering the money, and (3) reforming the system. The Pakistani regulators on the other hand only pursued institutional restructuring mainly focusing on replacement of the badla system. No criminal or civil charges were filed, and no recovery was sought. This response may have been perceived by the market as weak, and may not have conveyed a strong signal to the market regarding government's resolve for effective enforcement. It is possible that extra-market manipulations by speculators, such as documented by Khwaja and Mian (2005) , may have frustrated the efforts of the KSE regulators. Another possibility is that the badla system may not have been a cause of the alleged speculative fever, as was the case for BSE reported by researchers and mentioned earlier.
Another significant factor is that, in India, the National Stock Exchange is a viable competitor to the BSE. The competitive environment in the market for the service of organised exchanges creates stronger pressures on the regulatees to selfregulate, reform, modernisation and comply with the public policy. It strengthens the hands of the regulators in dealing with the recalcitrant and vested "clubby" organisational cultural which allegedly surrounds both stock exchanges. In, case of KSE, however, it's near monopoly position may have been a factor in frustrating the goals of the regulators.
